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Recent revelations that North Korea has maintained its nuclear weapon program in violation of prior international agreements highlight the adversarial relationship between Washington and Pyongyang. 1 For 50 years, American foreign policy has tried to co-opt or shun North Korea, usually without success. Prior U.S. attempts at engagement have been halfhearted at best, often being nothing more than an opportunity for Pyongyang to extract concessions from the West. The United States should re-evaluate its approach toward North
Korea and implement a comprehensive and integrated strategy that offers tangible incentives for cooperation backed by substantial costs for non-compliance.
Such a strategy is presented in part one of this paper. U.S. objectives toward North Korea are identified and prioritized; the effectiveness of diplomatic, economic, information, and military means toward North Korea are presented; and a plan for implementing these options is developed. Part two assumes that peaceful options for attaining U.S. goals in North Korea fail and that Washington must resort to military force. Capabilities, constraints, and goals of the antagonists are identified and assumptions made about their likely courses of action. From this framework a military strategy is presented that provides a viable alternative for the United States.
I.
Strategic Objectives
The number one priority for Washington is to ensure that Pyongyang does not develop or acquire the means to unleash the horrors of nuclear war. North Korea, realizing that its power is diminishing relative to its neighbors and the West, has been pursuing nuclear weapons for years.
Recent U.S. intelligence estimates indicate Pyongyang has accomplished all of the phases of nuclear warhead manufacturing and may have enough fuel to produce one or two weapons.
2
Should Kim Jong-Il develop the capability to use these weapons, Japan and South Korea would be held hostage to Pyongyang's bellicose policies. Perhaps more disturbing is the possibility that North Korea will share these weapons with states or groups hostile to the United States or its allies.
North Korean scientists are also developing ballistic missiles capable of striking targets 4,000 miles away. The Taepo Dong series of intermediate-range missiles is the most sophisticated offensive weapon system outside the major nuclear powers. Once fully operational, the Taepo Dong-II would be capable of striking any country in Asia, as well as Alaska and Hawaii. 3 Moreover, Pyongyang has sold these missiles, or the technology behind them, to nations openly or potentially hostile to the United States. 4 As a second priority, the United States must freeze North Korea's development of intermediate-and long-range missiles and block their transfer to additional rogue states.
The Korean Peninsula remains a fertile ground for conventional warfare. North and South
Korea have technically been at war for more than fifty years and two of the most potent land armies in the world face one another across a fragile demilitarized zone (DMZ). 5 The threat of invasion keeps tensions high and diverts attention and resources away from other needs and opportunities. As such, a third priority for the United States is to reduce the conventional military threat on the peninsula in a manner that gives both sides confidence that they will not be attacked.
A divided Korea is a relic of the Cold War and remains an unnatural solution to a political struggle that essentially ended with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. In every case since World War II, people within a partitioned country have sought reunification. In Germany, this process was achieved peacefully; in Vietnam, reunification was achieved by force. Because the division of the Korean people is the main and underlying source of tension on the peninsula, the fourth, albeit long-term, priority for the United States is the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas under a democratic government.
Strategic Options
The United States has several means it can employ for achieving its strategic objectives on United States can also ratchet up pressure on the North by reviewing the composition of U.S. forces in South Korea to ensure the proper mix of capabilities is present, increasing the number of troops deployed in the South, and increasing the frequency and intensity of joint exercises.
The ultimate stick is U.S. military intervention in North Korea. If Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them against the United States, Washington and its allies should move to militarily erase this threat. This, of course, is the option of last resort. Relations with key allies and potential adversaries will be tested and, as Clausewitz so elegantly explained, chance, reason, and passion may interact to create unexpected outcomes.
Opportunities and Constraints
What are the benefits to be gained from a successful U.S. strategy against North Korea?
Achieving a comprehensive peace agreement that includes the elimination of Pyongyang's nuclear weapon and long-range ballistic missile programs, along with a reduction in conventional military forces on both sides of the DMZ, will help normalize relations in North Asia and reduce tensions felt in Seoul, Pyongyang, Tokyo, and even Beijing. 23 Most of all, it will allow regional governments to free resources that were applied to defense and redirect them toward constructive pursuits-such as economic development in the region.
A reduced military threat from North Korea will permit the United States to withdraw forces from the peninsula. Since the end of the cold war, U.S. military commitments have grown to the point where nearly half a million American soldiers are stationed in over 146 countries. 
This is a tremendous financial burden on the United States, particularly at a time when
Washington is striving to transform its military into a lighter, more mobile force. American units assigned to Korea are considered "heavy" forces and are prepared to fight a conventional forceon-force war. The opportunity to disengage from this commitment without jeopardizing peace on the peninsula is a tremendous benefit for a military looking to reinvent itself.
The elimination of the long-range ballistic missile threat from North Korea will take some of the pressure off the United States to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) 
Political Setting and Objectives
Washington has four political objectives going into a military conflict with North Korea.
First and foremost, the United States must have the direct support of South Korea and Japan. 
Military Strategic Setting
Washington and its coalition partners have the military resources necessary to attain these objectives. This is predicated, of course, on the assumption that the United States is not already engaged in another major military conflict. Coalition operations against the North will encumber the bulk of U.S. strategic lift assets, not to mention strike aircraft and Special Operations Forces (SOF). These forces must be applied early in the conflict and cannot be tied up conducting missions elsewhere around the globe.
Although it is the most powerful nation in the world, the United States must prepare to fight a conventional war against the North. Since the impetus for military intervention is the removal of nuclear weapons from the peninsula, the United States cannot initiate the use of such weapons without rebuke. Washington, however, must warn Pyongyang that if the North employs nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against coalition forces or allies, the United
States is able to respond in kind with overwhelming force.
The United States will fight a coalition war. Washington expects South Korea to fight along side U.S. forces throughout the conflict. Japan is expected to allow U.S. forces to stage and strike from her territory as well as to defend coalition forces on the islands and along the sea lines of communication between Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Should China or Russia join the coalition against North Korea, their conventional military will add overwhelming force to the campaign.
North Korea will fight alone. Pyongyang can be expected to defend itself initially with conventional weapons-saving any nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons capability as a bargaining chip to stop hostilities or strike allies should they threaten the survival of the ruling regime.
Military Objectives
North Korea's center of gravity is its authoritarian regime. It is critical for the U.S.-led coalition to quickly sever Kim Jong-Il's ability to command and control his military forces. This is particularly important when confronting the threat of nuclear weapons and ballistic missileswhere authority for use is undoubtedly centralized at the top. Disrupting strategic command and control will also prohibit North Korean forces from quickly reacting to the superior mobility of U.S. forces.
In addition to "decapitating" the North Korean leadership, coalition forces would seek to locate, isolate, and destroy known nuclear weapon and ballistic missile sites before the North can relocate or use these weapons. Coalition forces would also seek to isolate North Korea's frontline forces by interdicting enemy lines of communication and supply. Once these units are cut off from reinforcement, coalition forces can move to destroy them. Defensively, coalition forces will strive to ensure that Seoul is not overrun and that Pusan and other key ports and airfields remain operational.
Pyongyang understands that the center of gravity for the U.S.-led coalition is its political unity. If the North can drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea or Japan, the coalition's ability to effectively carry on the fight will be destroyed. The best way for North Korea to achieve this objective is to rapidly increase the political cost of the war. This can be accomplished through escalation-by using weapons of mass destruction against coalition cities.
It can also be gained through inflicting casualties on the battlefield at a rate beyond what public support in the coalition countries will tolerate. Kim Jong-Il realizes that if he can undermine U.S. public support for the war, his stands a good chance of surviving the conflict.
The war cannot end before all North Korean nuclear weapons are captured or destroyed, all long-range ballistic missiles (and related production facilities) are eliminated, the North Korean military is defeated, and the regime in Pyongyang removed from power. Any termination short of this is doomed to failure. Coalition forces will need to occupy North Korea to install a local government, rebuild key infrastructure, maintain order, and ensure that other nations, such as China and Russia, refrain from undermining U.S. efforts for the new, unified Korea.
Military Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
The U.S. military is the strongest and most capable in the world. 29 As shown in Operations DESERT STORM and ENDURING FREEDOM, the U.S. military is able to project power around the globe and apply it in unique ways. There is no doubt that the United States and its coalition partners have the military means to win a conventional conflict with North Korea.
Coalition forces would command the skies and the seas, and present sufficient land power to defend the DMZ against the superior numbers of the North Korean Army. Although the North Korean military will initially outnumber coalition forces on the ground (about 1,000,000 to 600,000), the United States and its allies should be able to apply superior technology in weaponry and intelligence, as well as flexibility in battlefield command and control to defeat the North.
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Despite its high technology force, the United States has low technology vulnerabilities.
First and foremost is the need to quickly augment the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South The coalition strategy will emphasize the application of overwhelming technology, maneuver, and surprise. Coalition air forces will strike first to disrupt North Korea's command and control and air defense capability. Air power will be used concurrently to strike targets associated with Pyongyang's weapons of mass destruction program and logistical choke points and stockpiles. Finally, the full weight of the coalition air campaign will be applied toward the destruction of North Korea's ground forces.
Coalition ground forces will apply both a direct and indirect approach against the North.
Heavy ground forces will defend the DMZ and conduct massive counter battery fire against North Korean artillery forces. Lighter, more mobile forces-including U.S. Marines-will conduct amphibious landings along both littorals and behind enemy lines. These forces will strive to capture the North's nuclear-and ballistic missile-associated facilities. It is imperative that these forces strike quickly before North Korean defenders can react.
Coalition naval forces will defend the vital sea lines of communication between the United States and Japan, and between Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Naval forces will also insert SOF forces prior to the start of hostilities, mine North Korean ports, support the amphibious landings, and conduct cruise missile and carrier air strikes against North Korean targets.
Prior to the start of hostilities and throughout the conflict, coalition SOF will penetrate enemy defenses, identify key North Korean targets, destroy high priority nuclear and ballistic missile facilities, and support coalition landings behind enemy lines.
The North Korean military strategy will probably stress limited objectives, such as the cessation of fighting and a return to the bargaining 
Potential Results
North Korea is facing a war it cannot win. Pyongyang's conventional military might is diminishing relative to coalition forces, forcing the North to rely on weapons of mass destruction for deterrence and defense. It is precisely these weapons of mass destruction that are isolating
Pyongyang from potential allies and building the international coalition forcing their removal.
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If coalition forces strike North Korea and Pyongyang chooses not to use weapons of mass destruction, they will be defeated. If the North uses these weapons, it will have proved the international case against itself, forcing coalition forces to use whatever means necessary to disarm North Korea and remove Kim Jong-Il from power.
The political, economic, military, and humanitarian costs of war on the Korean Peninsula depend on the ability of coalition forces to destroy or neutralize North Korean weapons of mass destruction before they can be employed in the conflict. If this is achieved, coalition forces will win, but the cost in terms of military and civilian casualties will be substantial. Korea unleash weapons of mass destruction upon the South and Japan, the coalition will ultimately win, but the costs would rise exponentially. Not only would military and civilian casualties skyrocket, but the political and economic costs in terms of public fear, eroded international standards of behavior, and destroyed industrial infrastructure, make the next Korean War something the world hasn't seen since 1945.
Conclusion
The standoff between Washington and Pyongyang is fraught with peril. The United States wants North Korea to eliminate the weapons Pyongyang believes are increasingly necessary for its own survival. Domestically, North Korea is facing starvation and economic ruin.
Internationally, Pyongyang is isolated and increasingly viewed as a pariah by former allies. The
North's only means for survival rests with those nations allied against it. A rational North Korea would seek to accommodate the United States through diplomatic bargaining, trading its weapons of mass destruction for the means to rescue its people and preserve its leadership.
But Kim Jong-Il does not always act rationally. The North may only be interested in buying time until it can field these weapons and extort the support it needs to survive. If this is the case, coalition forces have the conventional capability to defeat North Korea, eliminate its weapons of mass destruction, and replace the ruling regime. While the future for Pyongyang is bleak, how much is the United States willing to pay to achieve its objectives? The stakes are too high to continue a policy of isolation. U.S. engagement, employing a multilateral approach where incentives and sanctions are linked to North Korean behavior, is the best answer.
